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The legal landscape for corporate directors and officers has been
radically altered in the last two years in the aftermath of spectacular
failures such as Enron Corp., Global Crossing Ltd. and WorldCom
Inc. In response, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
instituted several new requirements for directors and officers of pub-
licly-held companies, and spelled out harsh penalties for those who do
not comply. Additionally, courts have held directors and officers of
private corporations liable for violating the duties they owe to their
corporate constituents. It is safe to say that those who manage corpo-
rations are being watched ever more closely, both by enforcement
agencies and by the plaintiffs' bar. E. Norman Veasey, chief justice of
the Supreme Court of Delaware, recently dispensed sage advice to
directors when he suggested that "[d]irectors who are supposed to be
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independent should have the guts to be a pain in the neck and act
independently."'
This is even more true for those who manage public or private com-
panies that are either insolvent or on the brink of insolvency. Al-
though the U.S. economy is showing signs of recovery from its recent
downturn, many companies continue to face serious financial chal-
lenges. Directors and officers of these companies face mounting pres-
sure to fix their solvency crises quickly by selling assets, restructuring
debt, instituting radically new corporate strategies, or by other means.
However, one must proceed very carefully when making these corpo-
rate decisions, because they can serve as the basis of lawsuits claiming
breach of fiduciary duties, or of other claims based upon laws relating
to fraudulent conveyances or illegal dividends. Those in charge of a
financially troubled company may have their actions questioned by
courts, creditors, bankruptcy trustees, and shareholders who have the
benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight.
Additionally, directors and officers of insolvent or near-insolvent
corporations may be tempted to enhance the corporation's short term
liquidity by failing to make required payments, which may expose di-
rectors and officers to personal liability. Such payments arise under
tax and environmental statutes, and may impose personal liability on
directors and officers of a corporation that fails to obey such statutes.
This Article discusses the fiduciary duties owed by directors and of-
ficers of companies that are either insolvent or near-insolvent (i.e., in
the "zone of insolvency"), as well as the methods by which courts de-
termine a company's solvency. The Article then provides suggestions
for actions that directors and officers can take to limit their personal
exposure to liability in managing their companies.
II. BACKGROUND: THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS OF SOLVENT CORPORATIONS AND THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE
The business affairs of a corporation are normally managed by, or
under the direction of, a board of directors.2 Officers are typically
chosen by, and serve under, the board. The actions and decision-mak-
ing of the board and officers are governed by the law of the corpora-
tion's state of incorporation. As most large U.S. corporations are
1. Julie Connelly, The Ghost of Michael Ovitz Still Haunts the Disney Board, CORP. BOARD
MEMBER (Nov./Dec. 2003).
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2003); REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.01
(1995); Richard M. Cieri, et al., The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Financially Troubled Com-
panies, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 405, 406 (1994).
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incorporated in the state of Delaware, the Delaware General Corpo-
ration Law is widely regarded as the most influential body of corpo-
rate statutes in the country. A long line of case law in Delaware and
other states have established that directors and officers of a solvent
corporation owe their fiduciary duties primarily (if not exclusively) to
the corporation and its shareholders. 3 The primary fiduciary duties
are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.4
A. The Duty of Care
The duty of care requires directors and officers to act in an in-
formed and considered manner. Directors and officers have a duty to
be informed of all material information reasonably available to them
before making a decision, and they have the duty to use reasonable
care in making the decision itself.5 Some courts have held that the
duty of care requires directors and officers to exercise the degree of
care that an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise
under the same or similar circumstances. 6 Other courts have held that
the duty of care is breached if the directors and officers were grossly
negligent.7 The duty of care can be violated by an "unconsidered fail-
ure" to act in situations in which due attention would arguably have
prevented a loss. 8
B. The Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty requires that directors and officers act in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken is in the best inter-
ests of the corporation.9 Directors and officers must be disinterested
3. See, e.g., United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996); Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F.
Supp. 2d 684, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Guth v. Loft, Ina, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("while techni-
cally not trustees, [directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockhold-
ers"); Cieri, supra note 2, at 407.
4. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
5. See id. at 872; see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367-68 (Del. 1993),
modified in part on other grounds 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (directors breached duty of care and
were grossly negligent when they made an uninformed decision to sell company for too low a
price); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
6. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
7. See Cede, 634 A.2d at 364; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
8. See, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Deriva-
tive Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
9. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); Venoco, Inc. v. Eson, No. 19506-
NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 65, at *20 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2002).
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and independent. 10 The duty of loyalty mandates that the best inter-
ests of the corporation and its shareholders take precedence over any
interest that is possessed by a director, officer, or controlling share-
holder, but not shared by shareholders generally.11 This means that
directors "can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect
to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-
dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation
or all stockholders generally.
12
C. Directors and Officers of Solvent Corporations Do Not Owe
Fiduciary Duties to Creditors
Most courts have determined that directors and officers of a solvent
corporation owe no fiduciary duties to the creditors of the corpora-
tion.13 Additionally, no fiduciary duties are owed to holders of stock
options or convertible debentures, at least until purchase or conver-
sion occurs. 14 Creditors of a solvent corporation can only expect the
protection for which they had bargained when they entered into their
transactions with the corporation. Creditors of a solvent corporation
can also rely on lawsuits claiming fraud, the protections afforded by
state statutes and the federal securities laws, and the "morals of the
marketplace,"' 15 and cannot rely on the "special and rare" obligations
imposed on a fiduciary.16 Indeed, directors and officers may face law-
suits brought by shareholders if the corporation grants creditors more
rights than those for which they had bargained.' 7
10. See, e.g., Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002); Kahn v. Tremont
Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429 (Del. 1997); Cede, 634 A.2d at 361-63; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984).
11. See Cede, 634 A.2d at 361; Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); Litt v. Wycoff,
No. 19083-NC, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 23, at *12-*13 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2003).
12. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that "[b]orrower-
lender relationships are typically at arm's-length, and a firm's obligations to creditors are gener-
ally regarded solely as contractual"); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp.
1504, 1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 906 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1990)
(holding that unsecured creditors are not protected by common law fiduciary duties).
14. See, e.g., FS Photo, Inc. v. Picturevision Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 473, 484 (E.D. Va. 1999);
Powers v. British Vita, P.L.C., 969 F. Supp. 4, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (no fiduciary duties owed to
holders of stock options); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 302-03 (Del. 1988) (holding that direc-
tors owed no fiduciary duty to debenture holders); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 219 (Del.
Ch. 1974); but see Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933, 941
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982) (holding that directors owed a fiduciary duty to
holders of convertible debentures).
15. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. at 1524-25.
16. Id. at 1524-25.
17. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 958 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that had
the corporation conferred upon holders of the debentures rights significantly greater than those
[Vol. 2:295
2004] DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND THE ZONE OF INSOLVENCY 299
D. The Business Judgment Rule
A very important protection available to corporate directors and
officers is the "business judgment rule," which is a "presumption that
in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the ac-
tion taken was in the best interests of the company. ' 18 The business
judgment rule is a common-law recognition that the authority to man-
age a corporation is vested in the board of directors,19 recognizes that
corporate decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty, and
prevents courts from imposing liability on the basis of ex post judicial
hindsight.20 Under the rule, directors and officers are not held liable
for losses due to imprudence or honest errors of judgment, so long as
the challenged corporate decision can be attributed to any rational
business purpose.21
A director or officer of a solvent corporation is generally entitled to
the protection of the business judgment rule unless it is demonstrated
that the director or officer has breached his or her fiduciary duties. In
other words, shareholders bear the burden of overcoming the pre-
sumption that directors and officers have complied with their fiduciary
duties. 22 In Delaware, the business judgment rule will not apply in
situations where directors and officers were "grossly negligent" or
were engaged in transactions in which they were not disinterested and
independent.23
In determining whether a director or officer is entitled to the pro-
tections afforded by the business judgment rule, courts generally ex-
amine the following factors: (a) whether the director or officer made
an informed decision after making a reasonable effort to inform him-
self or herself of the relevant facts,24 (b) whether the director or of-
set out in the indenture, the corporation's directors and officers might have faced claims by its
own shareholders for waste and corporate mismanagement); Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors breached their duty
of loyalty by preferring noteholders to stockholders when entering a lock-up agreement).
18. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003); MM Cos., Inc. v.
Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del.
1984); Cieri, supra note 2, at 408.
19. See, e.g., MM Cos., Inc., 813 A.2d at 1127; Cieri, supra note 2, at 408.
20. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 927; MM Cos., Inc., 813 A.2d at 1128.
21. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 927; MM Cos., Inc., 813 A.2d at 1128.
22. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 927; MM Cos., Inc., 813 A.2d at 1127-28; Spiegel v.
Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990); Cieri, supra note 2, at 408.
23. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812;
In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., S'holders Litig., 825 A.2d 240, 257 (Del. Ch. 2002).
24. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872; Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914, 925-26 (Del. Ch.
1987); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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ficer reasonably believed that the action taken was in the best
interests of the corporation and its stockholders, 25 and (c) the disinter-
estedness of the director or officer (i.e., whether he or she engaged in
self-dealing). 26
Though the business judgment rule is a powerful shield for officers
and directors, it is not perfect. If a business decision leads to failure,
courts may scrutinize that decision using perfect hindsight. In other
words, courts might question after the fact whether the directors and
officers acted with sufficient care, or whether they had any conflicting
loyalties. If the court decides not to apply the business judgment rule
to a corporate decision, the directors and officers have the burden of
demonstrating the "entire fairness" of the transaction, in which direc-
tors and officers will have to prove that the transaction was inherently
fair to stockholders (i.e., that the transaction was the product of fair
dealing and involved the payment of a fair price). 27 The entire fair-
ness standard is a much more stringent standard than the business
judgment rule because it is an objective one. 28 The court will make its
own determination of whether the transaction was fair, and will disre-
gard the conclusions drawn by the corporation's directors and officers.
III. THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF
CORPORATIONS THAT ARE INSOLVENT OR ARE IN THE
"ZONE OF INSOLVENCY"
A. Directors and Officers of Insolvent Corporations Owe Their
Fiduciary Duties to Creditors
Once a corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duties of of-
ficers and directors shift and run primarily (if not exclusively) to the
corporation and its creditors. When a corporation is a debtor in bank-
25. See, e.g., Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (a court may
review the substance of a business decision made by an apparently well motivated board for the
purpose of assessing whether that decision is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment
that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith); Orman v. Cullman,
794 A.2d 5, 20 (Del. Ch. 2002).
26. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989); State
of Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *56 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 4, 2000).
27. See, e.g., Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (finding that
a self-dealing transaction will pass muster only if it is objectively and intrinsically fair); Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983) ("[tlhe requirement of fairness is unflinch-
ing in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of
establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts").
28. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Nixon v. Blackwell,
626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); Mills, 559 A.2d at 1279.
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ruptcy proceedings, the fiduciary duties of its directors and officers of
that corporation clearly run to the creditors.29 The reason for the shift
in fiduciary duties is that interests of shareholders are subordinate to
the claims of creditors. Under the Bankruptcy Code's "absolute pri-
ority rule," a corporation's plan of reorganization may provide recov-
ery for shareholders only if creditors either are paid in full or accept
less than full payment.30 Additionally, creditors of an insolvent corpo-
ration have an immediate interest in the value of the corporation's
assets, because it is from these assets that their claims will be paid.31
Shareholders no longer have a valuable interest in these assets. The
shift in fiduciary duties is applied to ensure that the asset value of an
insolvent corporation is preserved for creditors, who are the parties
for whom the corporation's assets most matter.
Arguably, with an insolvent corporation, its shareholders would
prefer that directors and officers take the corporate assets and "go to
Las Vegas": using the assets in extremely risky ventures that have a
high probability of failure, but hold even the smallest possibility of
astounding success. If the gamble succeeds, shareholders are back in
the money. However, if the ventures fail, the shareholders lose noth-
ing and creditors lose the value of the bet.
B. Directors and Officers of Corporations that are in the "Zone of
Insolvency" Must Enhance the Corporation's Wealth
Generating Capacity
Directors and officers owe their fiduciary duties to creditors even if
the corporation is not yet insolvent, but is rather in the "zone of insol-
vency" or "vicinity of insolvency. ' 32 For purposes of determining the
fiduciary duties of officers and directors, a corporation may reach the
point of insolvency before it formally commences bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.33 It is unclear whether the fiduciary duties of directors and
29. See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors Comm. of STN Enter., Inc. v. Noyes, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d
Cir. 1985); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443, 459 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Cieri, supra note 2, at
410.
30. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(8)(A); 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2003).
31. See Christopher L. Barnett, Healthco and the "Insolvency Exception": An Unnecessary
Expansion of the Doctrine?, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 441, 450 (2000).
32. See, e.g., Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Official Comm. of Un-
secured Creditors v. Reliance Capital Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956,
960 (D. Del. 1994) (citing Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., No
CIV.A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (fiduciary duties are owed to
creditors in the case of a corporation that is in the vicinity of insolvency)); Steinberg v. Kendig
(In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 655 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
33. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34; Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621
A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992).
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officers of corporations in the zone of insolvency shift completely to
creditors, or whether such duties continue to be owed to shareholders
as well. Some courts have held that the fiduciary duties of directors
and officers of such a corporation are owed solely to creditors, 34 while
others have ruled that directors and officers continue to owe their fi-
duciary duties to shareholders. 35
In Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 36 a Mas-
sachusetts bankruptcy court applied Delaware law to determine that
directors who voted to approve a leveraged buyout (LBO) that alleg-
edly left the corporation with unreasonably small capital violated their
fiduciary duties to the corporation. In this case, the corporation was
not insolvent, nor was it in the zone of insolvency prior to the chal-
lenged transaction, however the transaction itself left the corporation
with unreasonably small capital.37 The court noted that, "[w]hen a
transaction renders a corporation insolvent, or brings it to the brink of
insolvency, the rights of creditors become paramount. '38 The court
noted that this differed from the "normal" situation in which "what is
good for the corporation's stockholders is good for the corporation. '39
The Healthco analysis hinges on whether a transaction leaves the
corporation with "unreasonably small capital," which the court de-
fined as a "condition of financial debility short of insolvency . . . but
which makes the insolvency reasonably foreseeable. ' 40 Thus, "a
transaction leaves the company with unreasonably small capital when
it creates an unreasonable risk of insolvency, not necessarily a likeli-
hood of insolvency. ' 41 The Healthco analysis provides that directors
and officers would owe fiduciary duties to creditors if, at the time of
the proposed transaction, the corporation's financial condition was
such that the transaction would run the risk of leaving the corporation
with unreasonably small capital.42
34. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1992) ("when a corpora-
tion becomes insolvent.., the officers and directors no longer represent the stockholders"); First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Polonitza, Case No. 88-C-2998, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9449, at *12
(N.D. Ill. July 27, 1990).
35. See, e.g., Sanford Fork & Tool Co. v. Howe Brown & Co., 157 U.S. 312,317 (1895); Comm.
of Creditors of Xonics Med. Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re Xonics, Inc.), 99 B.R. 870, 872 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989); Bank Leumi-Le-Israel, B.M. v. Sunbelt Indus., Inc., 485 F. Supp. 556, 559 (S.D.
Ga. 1980).
36. Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 296 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1997).
37. See id. at 302.
38. See id. at 300.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 302.
41. In re Healthco Int'l., Inc., 208 B.R. at 302.
42. See id.; see also Barnett, supra note 31, at 459.
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The simple distinction between creditors and stockholders ignores
the differences between trade debt, subordinated debt, secured debt,
preferred stock, and common stock. Holders of each of these securi-
ties have different economic interests that shift and conflict as a com-
pany moves in and out of the zone of insolvency. In analyzing the
fiduciary duties of directors and officers of corporations in the zone of
insolvency, courts have not addressed distinctions among the different
classes of debt and equity.43
Because it is unclear whether directors and officers of corporations
in the zone of insolvency owe their fiduciary duties to shareholders
(or, even if fiduciary duties are no longer owed to common sharehold-
ers, whether fiduciary duties are owed to holders of preferred stock,
subordinated debt, etc.), it is wise for directors and officers to take
actions that will maximize the corporation's long-term wealth-creating
capacity. This would fulfill the fiduciary obligations to all of the cor-
poration's stakeholders. At least one court specifically noted that di-
rectors of a corporation in the zone of insolvency have an obligation
to the "community of interest that sustained the corporation to exer-
cise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maximize the corpo-
ration's long-term wealth creating capacity." 44
C. Courts May Apply Heightened Scrutiny to Actions of Directors
and Officers of Insolvent and Near-Insolvent Corporations
Courts disagree about whether the business judgment rule applies
to decisions made by directors and officers of corporations that are
insolvent or in the "zone of insolvency." Some courts have applied
the business judgment rule to decisions by directors and officers of
these corporations.45 Other courts have ruled that the business judg-
43. See Richard M. Cieri, et al., Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Avoiding the Solvency-Related
Pitfalls in Spinoff Transactions, 54 Bus. LAW. 533 (1999); George W. Kuney, Fiduciary Duties of
Directors and Officers Operating in the Zone of Insolvency, CAL. Bus. L. PRAc. 5 (2002).
44. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991
WL 277613, at *34; see also Steinberg v. Kendig, No. 97C7934, 97C6043 (consolidated), 2000 WL
28266, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2000) (citing Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34).
45. See, e.g., Angelo Gordon & Co., L.P. v. Allied Riser Comm. Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229
(Del. Ch. 2002) (stating, as a "preliminary view," that "even where the law recognizes that the
duties of directors encompass interests of creditors, there is room for application of the business
judgment rule"); Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating
that an independent board of directors may consider impacts upon all corporate constituencies
in exercising its good faith business judgment); Comm. of Creditors of Xonics Med. Sys., Inc. v.
Haverty (In re Xonics, Inc.), 99 B.R. at 875-76; Cf. Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Logue
(In re Logue Mech. Contracting Corp.), 106 B.R. 436, 440-41 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding
that the directors were not entitled to the business judgment rule presumption because they
decided to continue to operate the business, even though it was clear that the corporation could
not reorganize. The directors continued the corporation's business operations solely for their
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ment rule does not apply, and have characterized directors and of-
ficers as being "trustees" for the creditors of the corporation. 46 This
concept of a director or officer of an insolvent or near-insolvent cor-
poration as a "trustee" arises from the old trust fund doctrine, and
provides that a director or officer may be held liable under a simple
negligence standard without the benefit of the business judgment rule.
Courts applying Delaware law have suggested that a level of scru-
tiny higher than the business judgment rule applies to directors and
officers of corporations that are insolvent or will be rendered insol-
vent by corporate actions.47 Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the
business judgment rule is available to directors and officers of corpo-
rations that are either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency. In order
to minimize their exposure to liability, directors and officers of an in-
solvent or near-insolvent corporation should proceed with corporate
decisions on the assumption that the business judgment rule will not
apply, and that they will have to defend their actions under the much
more rigorous "entire fairness" standard.
Two cases illustrate that this course of action is wise because, even if
the court were to apply the business judgment rule to a corporate de-
cision, it may use its perfect hindsight in determining whether the di-
rectors and officers abided by their fiduciary duties.
own benefit); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 510 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating
that the business judgment rule may apply to a leveraged buyout transaction, but ultimately
holding that the business judgment rule did not apply to the particular transaction in question
because a majority of the directors were interested in the transaction as affiliates of the corpora-
tion's controlling shareholders).
46. See, e.g., Geren v. Quantum Chem. Corp., No. 95-7454, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 39912, at
*3 (2d Cir. Dec. 13, 1995) (noting that "[u]nder New York law, directors of a corporation may
become trustees of the creditors when the corporation is insolvent"); Automatic Canteen Co. of
Am. v. Wharton, 358 F.2d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1966); Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348,
354 (N.D. Tex. 1996) ("Delaware law recognizes that when a corporation becomes insolvent, the
assets of the corporation become a trust for the benefit of the corporation's creditors. The cor-
porate directors then hold a fiduciary duty as trustees to protect the assets for the creditors.")
(citing Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808 (Del. 1944)); New York Credit Men's Adjust-
ment Bureau v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397, 398 (1953) ("[i]f the corporation was insolvent at that
time it is clear that defendants, as officers and directors thereof, were to be considered as though
trustees of the property for the corporate creditor-beneficiaries").
47. See Xonics, Inc., 99 B.R. at 872 (court mentioned the trust fund doctrine and stated that
the directors "became trustees for the benefit of all creditors at the moment Xonics ... became
insolvent." However, the court went on to assess the transaction according to standards usually
applied under the business judgment rule); see also Miramar Res., Inc. v. Schultz, (In re Schultz),
208 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (in applying Delaware law, holding that directors of
an insolvent corporation owe trustee duties to creditors); Askanase v. Fatjo, Case No. H-91-3140,
1993 WL 208440, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 1993) (applying Delaware law and stating that "the
business judgment rule and other rules applicable to solvent corporations are of no effect in the
context of insolvency"); Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808 (Del. 1944). See generally
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, REORGANIZING FAILING BUSINESSES 16-1 - 16-40 (2003).
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1. Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco International, Inc.)
Though the court in Healthco appeared to allow the business judg-
ment rule to apply in transactions that leave a corporation with unrea-
sonably small capital, 48 the court refused to apply the business
judgment rule to the particular transaction in this case. The court held
that the business judgment rule was inapplicable because the directors
breached their duty of loyalty by having a pecuniary interest in the
LBO transaction. 49 The court also found that the directors were
"grossly negligent" and thus breached their duty of care by not in-
forming themselves of all material information available to them at
the time of the decision regarding the potentially detrimental effects
of the proposed LBO on the company. For example, the directors
relied solely on a flawed opinion of a solvency research company. The
court noted that the directors simply considered the effects that the
transaction would have on shareholders, rather than the on the corpo-
ration itself.50
2. Pereira v. Cogan
Pereira v. Cogan5' highlights the fact that courts will closely scruti-
nize the actions (and inactions) of directors and officers of private cor-
porations in the zone of insolvency. In that case, the Chapter 7 trustee
of Trace International Holdings, Inc. brought suit against Marshall S.
Cogan (the corporation's major stockholder) as well as the corpora-
tion's directors and officers, alleging that they breached their fiduciary
duties to the corporation and its creditors.52 The Chapter 7 trustee
challenged several corporate transactions approved by the corpora-
tion's board of directors, including: Mr. Cogan's excessive compensa-
tion; millions of dollars of loans to Mr. Cogan, his family members and
other insiders of the corporation; inappropriate and allegedly illegal
dividends; a birthday party held at the Metropolitan Museum of Mod-
em Art in Mr. Cogan's honor that cost over $1 million; and the em-
ployment of Mr. Cogan's daughter as a "consultant" with a salary of
48. See Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l), 208 B.R. 296, 306-07 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997).
49. See id. at 302-07.
50. See id. at 305-07.
51. Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
52. Courts appear to be split on the issue of whether a Chapter 7 trustee has standing to sue
on behalf of a corporation's creditors. Compare Pereira, 294 B.R. at 514 (stating that "[t]he
Trustee also represents the interests of [the corporation's] creditors"), with Healthco Int'l, 208
B.R. at 300 ("[ilt is of course true a trustee in bankruptcy is unable to enforce a claim belonging
to a creditor") (citing Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 432 (1972) (trus-
tee unable to pursue claims of debenture holders against debenture trustee)).
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well over $100,000 per year.53 Applying Delaware law, the court
found that the business judgment rule was not available to directors
and officers in this case, because they violated their fiduciary duties to
the corporation and its creditors.5 4
In holding that the directors breached their fiduciary duties, the
court noted that the board held very few meetings and that, when it
acted, it did so by written consent.55 The board did not seek the ad-
vice of outside professionals in determining the proper amount of
compensation to award Mr. Cogan. 56 The court found that that the
directors' "complete lack of any exercise of diligence in the perform-
ance of [their] duties," as well as their close relationship with Mr.
Cogan constituted a breach of their duties of care and loyalty.57
The court also held that the corporation's officers breached their
fiduciary duties with respect to transactions that they had the discre-
tionary authority to prevent.58 Specifically, the court held the corpo-
ration's general counsel and chief financial officer partly responsible
for the corporation's extension of illegal loans and certain other illegal
payments. 59
3. The Moral
It is extremely important that directors and officers of corporations
that are in the zone of insolvency do all that they can to comply with
their fiduciary duties. Directors must consider any material piece of
information relating to their corporate decisions, and must also con-
sider whether their decisions maximize the value of the corporation.
Boards of directors must meet often and carefully document what oc-
curred during each meeting in the minutes. Officers must indepen-
dently consider the impact of any action that they have the authority
to either implement or prevent.
IV. DETERMINING THE SOLVENCY OF THE CORPORATION
As discussed above, the solvency of a corporation determines to
whom its directors and officers owe their fiduciary duties. If the cor-
poration is solvent, its directors and officers owe their fiduciary duties
53. See Pereira, 294 B.R. at 486-98.
54. See id. at 528-33. The court stated that the business judgment rule would have been avail-
able to the directors and officers, but because they breached their fiduciary duties, the presump-
tions of the business judgment rule were rebutted. See id. at 526.
55. See id. at 499.
56. See id. at 529.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 522.
59. See Pereira, 294 BR. at 538-40.
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to the corporation and its stockholders. In contrast, if the corporation
is insolvent or nearly insolvent, directors and officers may face future
lawsuits by the corporation's creditors alleging a breach of fiduciary
duties.60 This shift of fiduciary duties to creditors from shareholders
occurs upon insolvency, even if the corporation has not commenced a
bankruptcy case.61 Accordingly, it is extremely important for direc-
tors and officers to closely monitor the corporation's financial
position.
There are two distinct tests for insolvency that a court will utilize.
The first is called the "balance sheet" test, and the second is called
either the "cash flow" test or the "equity" test.62 It is unclear whether
the corporation would have to be found insolvent under both tests in
order for fiduciary duties to shift to creditors, or whether the corpora-
tion being insolvent under only one test would suffice. There is some
support for the proposition that the fiduciary duties of a corporation's
directors and officers shift if the corporation is insolvent under either
test.
63
A. The Balance Sheet Test
The balance sheet test inquires whether the fair value of the corpo-
ration's liabilities exceed the fair market value of its assets. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, insolvency is defined as the sum of the debtor's
liabilities exceeding the sum of its assets "at a fair valuation." 64 Thus,
the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "insolvency" appears to incorpo-
60. See Cieri, supra note 43, at 557.
61. See, e.g., Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 354-55 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (applying
Delaware law); Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead Am.
Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 958 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994) (corporation in the "vicinity of insolvency" owed
a duty to its creditors).
62. See Richard M. Cieri, et al., An Introduction to Legal and Practical Considerations in the
Restructuring of Troubled Leveraged Buyouts, 45 Bus. LAw. 333, 359-60 (1989). As discussed
above, the Healthco decision articulated the concept of "unreasonably small capital," which re-
lies on the two tests for insolvency. See Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l), 208
B.R. 296, 300-02 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
63. See, e.g., Pereira, 294 B.R. at 520 (interpreting Delaware law as stating that a corporation
is insolvent if it is insolvent under either the balance sheet test or the cash flow test); LaSalle
Nat'l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 291 (D. Del. 2000) (analyzing the solvency of a
corporation using both the balance sheet test and the cash flow test); United States v. Gleneagles
Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 566, 578 (M.D. Pa. 1983) ("[a] reasonable construction of the... statutory
definition of insolvency indicates that it not only encompasses insolvency in the bankruptcy
sense, i.e., a deficit net worth, but also includes a condition wherein a debtor has insufficient
presently salable assets to pay existing debts as they mature") (citation omitted).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2003).
308 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:295
rate the balance sheet test of insolvency.65 Generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP), while relevant, are not controlling for
purposes of determining insolvency under the balance sheet test.66
Under this test, the corporation must assign a fair market value to its
assets, and must also estimate the amounts that it will ultimately be
required to pay on account of contingent liabilities.
1. Valuation of Assets
The Bankruptcy Code's "fair valuation standard," which has been
incorporated into the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), has
been interpreted as follows:
"[Flair value does not mean the amount the property would bring in
the worst circumstances or in the best . . . For example a forced sale
price is not fair value though it may be used as evidence on the
question of fair value ...The general idea of fair value is the
amount of money the debtor could raise from its property in a short
period of time, but not so short as to approximate a forced sale, if
the debtor operated as a reasonably prudent and diligent business-
man with his interests in mind, especially a proper concern for pay-
ment of his debts."67
A similar test adopted by the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA) is the "Present Fair Salable Value" test. This test also does
not require a distress sale or pure liquidation of assets. Courts have
65. See In re Healthco Int'l, 208 B.R. at 301 (stating that the statutory definition of insolvency
is "in essence, an excess of liabilities over the value of assets"); see also Cieri, supra note 62, at
359-60 (describing the conflicting statutory definitions of insolvency).
66. See, e.g., Official Asbestos Claimants' Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock &
Wilcox Co., Inc.), 274 B.R. 230, 260 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2002) ("[r]equiring application of GAAP
would make accountants and the board which promulgate GAAP the arbiters of insolvency
questions. Clearly the [Bankruptcy] Code provides that judges should make those decisions...
Thus, although GAAP are relevant, they are not controlling in insolvency determinations");
Hirsch v. Gersten (In re Centennial Textiles, Inc.), 220 B.R. 165, 175 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)
("[g]enerally accepted accounting principles... do not control a court's decision .... However,
the court is inclined to assign presumptive validity to the treatment of assets and liabilities ac-
cording to GAAP") (citations omitted); R.M.L., Inc. v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 187 B.R. 455, 464
(M.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that "subsequent events, such as actual collection rates for receivables,
that may not technically be cognizable under GAAP and Generally Accepted Auditing Stan-
dards, may be considered by the bankruptcy judge in insolvency determinations"); Hunter v.
Soc'y Bank & Trust (In re Parker Steel Co.), 149 B.R. 834, 845 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) ("in
valuing [diebtor's liability .. .although GAAP are relevant, they are not controlling"); Ohio
Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc., (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 B.R. 430, 438 n.1l (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1988) ("[i]n spite of their propriety according to GAAP, a court may modify balance sheet
entries ... in order to more accurately reflect the financial condition of the [d]ebtor").
67. Ohio Corrugating, 91 B.R. at 436-37 (quoting In re Joe Flynn Rare Coins, Inc., 81 B.R.
1009, 1017 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988)). See also Travellers Int'l AG v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (In
re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 134 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 1998) (valuing debtor's assets on a
going-concern basis using an 18-month disposition schedule as a reasonable time frame); Cieri,
supra note 43, at 561.
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defined present fair salable value as "that value which can be obtained
if the assets are liquidated with reasonable promptness in an arm's-
length transaction in an existing and not theoretical market."68
Under either valuation test, it is critical for directors and officers to
consider the extent to which the corporation's assets are readily mar-
ketable, especially in light of the contingent liabilities that may be as-
sociated with those assets and related successor liability issues.
Likewise, directors and officers must consider the time frame in which
they may be required to sell those assets or businesses, the state of the
current and future market for the company's assets and whether there
is in fact any potential buyer of the assets. Even if there is such a
buyer, directors and officers need to determine whether those assets
should be substantially "written down" from their book values for
purposes of determining the corporation's solvency. 69 The cost of dis-
posal must also be assessed in valuing those assets.
2. Valuing Contingent Liabilities
In determining the solvency of the corporation, courts have re-
quired the inclusion of contingent liabilities in the corporation's sol-
vency analysis. 70 Contingent liabilities may include obligations arising
under corporate guaranties of third party debts, potential losses in
pending or anticipated litigation, or the risk that the corporation may
be held accountable for the liabilities of a related entity under "veil
piercing" or "alter ego" theories.71
Accurately determining the value of contingent liabilities is a diffi-
cult task, especially given the inconsistent treatment of these liabilities
by the courts. Some courts have valued contingent liabilities at their
full face value. 72 However, most courts rightly discount contingent li-
68. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. at 578; see also SPC Plastics Corp. v. Griffith (In re
Structurlite Plastics Corp.), 193 B.R. 451, 460 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).
69. See Cieri, supra note 43, at 561-62.
70. See, e.g., In re Xonics Petrochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 199-200 (7th Cir. 1998); Barber v.
First Midwest Bankr/W. Ill., N.A. (In re Oneida Grain Co.), 202 B.R. 606, 609 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1996) (stating that a corporation's contingent liabilities should be discounted to their present
value); CCEC Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Chemical Bank (In re Consol. Capital Equities Corp.), 175
B.R. 629, 631 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994) (for purposes of solvency analysis under the UFTA, the
debtor must have been able to pay its liabilities, including the probable liability on contingent
debts).
71. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. (In re Hillsborough Holdings
Corp.), 176 B.R. 223, 251 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Castellani v. Kohne (In re Kucharek), 79 B.R. 393,
396-97 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987).
72. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Asbestos Pers. Injury Claimants v. Sealed Air Corp. (In re
W.R. Grace & Co.), 281 B.R. 852, 862-65 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (holding that unasserted and
unknown asbestos claims are not contingent and thus not subject to discount); Nickless v. Golub
(In re Worcester Quality Foods, Inc.), 152 B.R. 394, 403 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (contingent
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abilities by their probability of success.73 Generally, the value of a
particular contingent liability is calculated by determining the poten-
tial size of the liability, and adjusting the amount of the liability to
account for the probability that the contingency will materialize.74
Analyzing the value of contingent liabilities in this manner will help
directors and officers establish a reasonable estimate of the corpora-
tion's contingent liabilities, and will help them determine the circum-
stances under which the corporation might be viewed to be insolvent
after such liabilities are taken into account.
B. The "Cash Flow" or "Equity" Test
The cash flow test focuses on a company's ability to produce suffi-
cient cash (which can be derived from continuing operations, disposi-
tion of assets or other capital raising activities) for the payments of
debts as they mature. Most courts have stated that this test inquires
whether, both before and after the consummation of the proposed
transaction, the corporation will be capable of paying its debts as and
when they become due. 75 However, the court in Pereira rejected this
formulation of the test, and instead stated that a corporation is insol-
liabilities must be valued at full amount, not present value, when determining insolvency);
Marine Midland Bank v. Stein, 433 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (stating that the full
amount of contingency liability exceeded the fair value of assets at the time of the contested
transfer).
73. See, e.g., Xonics Petrochemical, 841 F.2d at 200 (multiplying the probability of the contin-
gent liability by the amount of the debtor's assets, not by the face amount of the contingent
liability, because "at worst [the debtor] would have to yield up all of its assets"); Lippe v.
Bairnco Corp., 249 F. Supp. 2d 357, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (taking into account the corporation's
probable liability on its existing debts, and stating that solvency must be gauged at the time of
the transaction, and not with the benefit of hindsight); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L. (In re R.M.L., Inc.), 92 F.3d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that
a court must take into consideration the likelihood of occurrence of an event triggering the
contingent liability); In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 923 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying
discount to reflect uncertainty of contingent CERCLA claim); Covey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank
of Peoria, 960 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that contingent liability cannot be valued at
its face value; rather it must be discounted by the probability that it will occur); In re Chase &
Sanborn Corp., 904 F.2d 588, 594 (11th Cir. 1990); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re
Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 B.R. 430, 439 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (for purposes of Section
548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, "speculation concerning uncertain and indeterminate liability
resulting from possible environmental violations must be discounted").
74. See In re Xonics Petrochemical, 841 F.2d at 199-200; see also In re R.M.L., 92 F.3d at 156.
75. See, e.g., LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 290 (D. Del. 2000) ("[u]nder
Delaware law, a corporation is insolvent when it is unable to pay its debts as they become due in
the ordinary course of business"); MFS/SUN Life Trust-High Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport
Serv. Co., 910 F. Supp. 913, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (a corporation is insolvent if it is unable to pay
its debts as they come due); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 579 (M.D.
Pa. 1983) (a corporation is insolvent under the cash flow test if it cannot produce enough cash to
pay its debts as they mature. However the fact that a corporation's assets are illiquid and could
not be sold to produce cash to pay the corporation's debts as they mature is not dispositive of the
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vent under the cash flow test "if it cannot generate and/or obtain
enough cash to pay for its projected obligations and fund its business
requirements for working capital and capital expenditures with a rea-
sonable cushion to cover the variability of its business needs over
time."'76 Even if a corporation is solvent under the balance sheet test,
it may be insolvent in the cash flow sense if it lacks liquidity and the
ability generate sufficient cash.77
In determining the solvency of the corporation under the cash flow
test, directors and officers should account for things such as the com-
pany's recent and probable future operating performance, the liquid-
ity of its assets, the value of deferred assets, impending maturities on
its debt, the value of contingent liabilities, and its ability to comply
with its loan covenants to draw on its credit facilities. In light of the
Pereira formulation of the cash flow test, it is advisable to include a
reasonable "cushion" in the solvency calculation to account for the
variability of the corporation's business needs over time.78
C. When in Doubt, Assume that the Corporation is Insolvent or in
the Zone of Insolvency
Under either insolvency test, courts may judge in hindsight whether
the corporation was insolvent at the time that the corporate decision
in question was made, "notwithstanding contrary presentations made
in the company's audited financial statements or made to its board of
directors."' 79 Accordingly, it is prudent for directors and officers to
adopt a conservative approach in their evaluation of the corporation's
solvency and to assume that the corporation is insolvent or within the
zone of insolvency if there is any reasonable question about the corpo-
ration's solvency.80
V. PROTECTING DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF A CORPORATION
THAT IS INSOLVENT OR IN THE ZONE OF INSOLVENCY
As discussed above, as a corporation approaches insolvency, its di-
rectors and officers face potential personal liability from different
sources, and the decisions they make will be subject to a different set
issue of solvency. A company with highly illiquid assets would not be insolvent if the operation
of its business produced sufficient cash for the payment of its debts as they mature).
76. Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
77. See Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l), 208 B.R. 288, 302 (D. Mass 1997).
78. See Pereira, 294 B.R. at 520-21.
79. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Mellon Bank, N.A. (In re R.M.L., Inc.), 187
B.R. 455, 464 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1995); Cieri, supra note 43, at 560.
80. Cieri, supra note 43, at 560.
312 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
of rules. By following the strategies outlined below, however, direc-
tors and officers can minimize the risks they face.
A. Comply with Fiduciary Duties
Because of the shift in the fiduciary duties they owe when a corpo-
ration becomes insolvent or enters the zone of insolvency, directors
and officers must monitor their company's financial position very
closely to determine whether it is operating in the zone of insolvency.
Directors and officers should assess the fair value of the corporation's
assets and liabilities conservatively and assume that the corporation is
insolvent, if there is any reasonable question about whether the corpo-
ration is insolvent under either solvency test. Upon proceeding on the
assumption that the corporation is in the zone of insolvency, directors
and officers should approach every corporate decision with the objec-
tive of enhancing the wealth generating ability of the corporation.
Moreover, directors and officers should assume that they will not be
able to take advantage of the business judgment rule and that they
will have to defend the intrinsic or entire fairness of those decisions.
1. Establish a Methodology for Determining Solvency
Because determining the solvency of a corporation at any point in
time is an inexact science at best and because courts may use hindsight
in judging the solvency of the company at the time of a contested cor-
porate action, it is advisable for directors and officers to use as many
data points as possible to help determine solvency. The following is
an example of a work plan that directors and officers can use to deter-
mine the solvency of their corporation under both the balance sheet
test and the cash flow test:
" review the corporation's historical financial statements (including
balance sheets and income statements);
" calculate the applicable financial ratios for the corporation, and
compare these ratios to those of competitors;
" review the corporation's business plan projections and assump-
tions, and compare them to historical performance, the expected
performance of competitors, and industry trends;
" investigate and analyze the corporation's business by assessing
the current conditions and external competitive factors that will
impact its operations and financial performance;
* investigate and analyze current market conditions that would im-
pact the corporation's sources of funding (including equity mar-
kets, debt markets, and interest rates);
" test the sensitivity of the corporation's financial projections with
respect to revenue variations, margin variations, and interest rate
changes;
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" determine the corporation's liquidity and free cash flow levels
under the projection scenarios;
" perform and evaluate a covenant compliance test for the corpora-
tion's funded debt obligations (both drawn and undrawn facili-
ties) under the projection scenarios;
* evaluate the equity cushion available to the company under each
of the projection scenarios;
* evaluate the safety margin of the cash flows under each of the
projection scenarios;
" investigate and assess the value of the corporation's assets (in-
cluding intangible assets); and
* investigate and assess the corporation's contingent and off bal-
ance sheet liabilities.
2. Retain Professionals to Value Assets
Professional advice is often necessary to assist directors and officers
in identifying whether the corporation is in the zone of insolvency.
Generally, the advice of qualified counsel and financial advisors
should be sought whenever directors or officers are considering a
transaction or other actions of significance to the corporation, its
stockholders, and its creditors. Such transactions include securing pre-
viously unsecured antecedent debts, the sale of a major asset, a spinoff
of a subsidiary, the incurrence of significant debt, or the issuance of a
dividend. In many circumstances, directors and officers will not be
able to satisfy the duty of care without the advice of legal and financial
professionals.81
3. Preserve the Protections of the Business Judgment Rule
There are certain circumstances under which courts routinely re-
voke the protections of the business judgment rule. By avoiding the
actions described below, directors and officers will increase the likeli-
hood that courts will apply the business judgment rule to their actions.
a. Avoid Conflicts of Interest
The duty of loyalty requires that directors and officers put the inter-
ests of the corporation and its shareholders (and creditors, if the cor-
poration is in the zone of insolvency) above the personal interests
possessed by a director, officer, or controlling shareholder.8 2 For ex-
81. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274-75 (2d Cir.
1986) ("[d]irectors may be held liable to shareholders for failing" to obtain reasonably available
"material information or to make a reasonable inquiry into material matters").
82. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 354, 361, modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994)
(citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984)).
314 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
ample, a transaction in which a director appears on both sides or in
which a director receives a personal benefit that is not received by
shareholders generally is considered to involve a conflict of interest
and should be avoided.83
b. Avoid Preferential Treatment of Insiders
Directors and officers must act in the best interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders (and creditors, if the corporation is in the
zone of insolvency). Accordingly, directors and officers should avoid
preferential treatment of other insiders, favored shareholders, or any
other discrete creditor or constituency. In addition, directors should
not accept personal benefits from supporting a particular
transaction. 84
c. Fully Disclose the Material Aspects of a Transaction
Directors and officers should endeavor to fully disclose all material
aspects of a transaction to independent directors. For example, a di-
rector should disclose all of his or her relationships with any principals
in the transaction, all of the director's contacts with interested third
parties, and all analyses or studies that suggest that the transaction
will result in a benefit to a director or officer. 85
d. Base All Corporate Decisions upon Sufficient
Information and Deliberation
As discussed above, the duty of care requires management to act in
an informed and considered manner. Accordingly, prior to making a
business decision, the directors should inform themselves of "all mate-
rial information reasonably available to them. '86 This may include re-
ports, studies, or other informational materials prepared by outside
professionals or employees of the corporation.
83. See, e.g., Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l., 208 B.R. 288, 302-05 (finding
that at least one director had a conflict of interest because he received a material personal bene-
fit from the challenged transaction); In re Bidermann Indus., U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547, 551
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that the proposed sale of a debtor's assets to the turnaround
firm that was acting as the debtor's CEO and majority shareholder, posed a classic conflict of
interest and would be subjected to heightened scrutiny because the transaction was "rife with the
possibility of abuse") (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. See In re Healthco Int'l, 208 B.R. at 302-05.
85. See id. Delaware has a specific provision, discussed below, in its corporate law for transac-
tions with interested directors and officers. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2003).
86. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
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4. Maintain Corporate Records Documenting Compliance with
Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Formalities
Deliberation, analysis, and information are vital to satisfying direc-
tors' and officers' fiduciary duties and maintaining the protections of
the business judgment rule. The lack of any of these elements may
result in the voiding of the transaction, disgorgement of assets, or per-
sonal liability. Because courts are willing to view certain transactions
with perfect hindsight, directors and officers must always keep the
possibility of judicial review in the back of their minds when making
decisions. Accordingly, directors should maintain detailed and accu-
rate corporate records documenting compliance with their fiduciary
duties and adherence to corporate formalities.
In the past, it was common for minutes of corporate board meetings
to be short, and the detail contained in them to be scant.87 Minutes of
a meeting would merely note that a specific action was approved,
without describing the directors' deliberations. However, because of
the heightened scrutiny that directors are facing with regard to their
corporate stewardship, failing to keep reasonably detailed records of
the events that occur in the boardroom is particularly unwise. Min-
utes of board and committee meetings should contain a description of
each significant item discussed by the directors, "including a summary
of the topic," the material issues presented in considering the topic,
and "the major factors taken into account - or relied upon -" in reach-
ing a decision.8 8 In sum, the minutes should provide sufficient detail
to clearly reflect what transpired in the meeting.
It may be advisable for a board or committee to hire an expert, such
as independent outside counsel, to draft the minutes for those meet-
ings in which major decisions are made. The reason for this is that the
minutes may eventually be closely examined by plaintiffs or judges
who are questioning the propriety of actions taken or not taken.89
The board could also require committee chairpersons to sign the min-
utes of each committee meeting, because it would help ensure that
they have carefully read the minutes. On the other hand, it is proba-
bly not preferable or necessary for very detailed minutes to be kept of
executive session meetings. This is because directors generally cannot
bind the board to any course of action during an executive session and
87. See Broc Romanek & Alan Dye, Board Meetings: Revisiting the Art of Taking Minutes, at
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/E-minders/archive/Oct2003.htm. (last visited Jan. 13, 2004).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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independent directors may not want management to know the details
of what occurred during the executive session.9°
The recent Walt Disney case highlights the need for directors to
keep detailed minutes of board meetings and to document all of the
steps they take in making a corporate decision. Failure to do so can
result in a court refusing to grant the directors protection under the
business judgment rule.
a. The Walt Disney case
In In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation,91 the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery refused to dismiss a derivative action against
the Walt Disney Company's board of directors, in which shareholders
alleged that the directors breached their fiduciary duties in connection
with the hiring and subsequent resignation of Michael Ovitz, who was
the president of Disney for a short period of time. According to the
plaintiffs, after meeting for less than one hour, Disney's compensation
committee recommended Mr. Ovitz's hiring to the full board, even
though the minutes of that meeting reflected that the committee re-
viewed only an incomplete summary of a draft of Mr. Ovitz's employ-
ment agreement and did not review several internal memoranda that
criticized the proposed terms of Mr. Ovitz's employment as being too
generous. 92
In an ensuing meeting, the full board approved Mr. Ovitz's employ-
ment. "The minutes of that meeting were fifteen pages long, but only
a page and a half" were devoted to the board's consideration of Mr.
Ovitz's employment.93 The minutes did not indicate that the directors
asked any questions about the details of Mr. Ovitz's salary, stock op-
tions, or the termination provisions in his employment agreement.
The minutes also did not indicate that the compensation committee
made any report to the board concerning its decision to hire Mr.
Ovitz. 94
90. Id.
91. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
92. Id. at 280. The final version of the employment agreement executed on December 12,
1995 (but backdated to October 1, 1995, the date Mr. Ovitz began serving as president) differed
greatly from the summary draft employment agreement provided to the compensation commit-
tee. Id. at 282. The final version granted Mr. Ovitz a large signing bonus, a number of stock
options that "was far beyond the normal standards of both Disney and corporate America," id.
at 280, as well as a "non-fault termination" clause that would pay Mr. Ovitz more than $38
million and grant him three million stock options when he would leave Disney's employ, as long
as he did not act with gross negligence or malfeasance. Id. at 282-289.
93. Id. at 281.
94. Id. at 281.
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The court stated that because there was no evidence that the direc-
tors seriously undertook their duty to consider the terms of Mr.
Ovitz's hiring and subsequent termination, it appeared that the direc-
tors "consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities,
adopting a 'we don't care about the risks' attitude concerning a mate-
rial corporate decision. '95 The court also stated that there was "rea-
son to doubt whether the board's actions were taken honestly and in
good faith."96 Accordingly, the court refused to apply the business
judgment rule in this situation and allowed the shareholders' deriva-
tive lawsuit to proceed. Furthermore, the court stated that the plain-
tiffs' allegations supported a finding that the directors' actions either
were "not in good faith" or "involve[d] intentional misconduct. '97
Such a finding would be significant because if a director consciously
ignores his or her duties to the corporation, thereby causing economic
injury to its stockholders, the director's actions may fall outside the
liability waiver of a Delaware corporation's certificate of incorpora-
tion.98 Therefore, Disney's directors could be held personally liable.
The Walt Disney case illustrates the importance of keeping ade-
quately detailed minutes of committee and board meetings, particu-
larly if a major corporate decision is made at such meetings. It is
possible that Disney's directors did indeed consider and discuss all of
the material information related to Mr. Ovitz's employment. How-
ever, because the minutes of the committee and board meetings were
so sparse the court drew an inference that the directors did not exer-
cise their duty of care. Furthermore, because shareholders and gov-
ernment regulators have recently become much more focused on the
high level of executive compensation,99 directors must take pains to
95. Id. at 289 (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 286.
97. Id. at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. The Delaware General Corporation Law provides that a corporation's certificate of incor-
poration may contain "[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a direc-
tor." DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003). However, the provision may, not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director:
(i) [flor any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders;
(ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law;
(iii) under § 174 of [the Delaware General Corporation Law]; or
(iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003).
99. William McDonough, chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, re-
cently observed that Americans are angry about corporate conduct, particularly about the high
level of executive compensation. Marcy Gordon, Americans Angry About Executive Pay, Offi-
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ensure that the minutes of meetings in which executive compensation
is approved demonstrate that the directors acted in an informed and
considered manner.
5. Take Advantage of Safe Harbor Provisions
In some instances, state law provides directors and officers with a
safe harbor that insulates them from liability with regard to a particu-
lar type of decision or action. For example, in Delaware, directors are
protected from liability for certain actions if they rely in good faith on
(a) the records of the corporation; (b) information, opinions, reports,
or statements presented to the company by its officers and employees
or by committees of the board of directors; and (c) information, opin-
ions, reports or statements presented to the company by any other
person as to matters the directors reasonably believe "are within such
other person's professional or expert competence" and whom the di-
rectors have selected using reasonable care. 100
To the extent possible, directors and officers should ensure that all
steps are taken to comply with and maximize the benefits of these safe
harbor rules. Directors and officers should also ensure that any deci-
sions are made only after appropriate deliberation and consideration
of all material information reasonably available to them. By taking
these steps, directors and officers can help ensure compliance with
their duty of care and thus preserve the protections of the business
judgment rule.
B. Take Steps to Avoid or Minimize Liability Arising from
Corporate Transactions
In order to avoid or minimize liability for transactions taken by the
corporation when it is insolvent or in the zone of insolvency, directors
and officers should comply with their duty of care and thoroughly ex-
amine the benefits and risks of each transaction. If a transaction re-
sults in the insolvency of the corporation or leaves it with
unreasonably small capital, courts may assume that the transaction
was improper and deny directors and officers the benefit of the busi-
ness judgment rule.101 As discussed above, directors and officers oft-
cial Says, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Oct. 21, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 66402999. The
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is a private-sector, non-profit corporation created
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to oversee the auditors of public companies.
100. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 172 (2003) (protection against liability for declaring an
illegal dividend).
101. See Cieri, supra note 43, at 560; see also Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Official Comm. of Un-
secured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc., 92 F.3d at 155 ("[tlhe use of hindsight to evaluate a debtor's
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entimes should engage professionals to identify the various risks
posed by a transaction and analyze the nature and extent of each risk.
1. Comply with Laws Regarding the Payment of Dividends and
Stock Redemptions
Directors and officers should ensure that the Board complies with
all applicable state laws regarding the payment of dividends. For ex-
ample, Section 174(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law pro-
vides that directors are jointly and severally liable to the corporation,
or "to its creditors in the event of dissolution or insolvency," for any
willful or negligent violation of the state's statutes regarding the pay-
ment of dividends or regarding the purchases or redemptions of
stock. 102 The statute also provides a safe harbor in which a director
can avoid this liability "by causing his or her dissent to be entered on
the books containing the minutes of the proceedings of the directors
at the time the same was done, or immediately after such director has
notice of the same."'1 3 Therefore, in Delaware it is important that
any dissent be timely, explicit, and entered in the minutes of the appli-
cable board meeting. 10 4
2. Be Very Cautious When Engaging in Insider Transactions
Directors and officers must carefully monitor transactions involving
the corporation in which they or another insider has either a direct or
indirect interest. Because of the danger that an insider can benefit at
the corporation's expense, these transactions are subject to height-
ened scrutiny. While some states have enacted statutes to allow cor-
porations to engage in these transactions,a0 5 directors and officers
financial condition for purposes of the [Bankruptcy] Code's 'insolvency' element has been criti-
cized by courts and commentators alike") (citations omitted).
102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 174(a) (2003).
103. Id.
104. As described above, in Delaware directors who voted in favor of an illegal dividend or an
illegal stock redemption will be protected from liability if they comply with the safe harbor
provisions of Section 172 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
105. Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides a safe harbor for trans-
actions between a corporation and a director or officer of the corporation. Such transactions are
permitted if the material facts of the transaction are disclosed to disinterested directors or a
committee thereof, and such directors or committee ratifies the transaction. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2003). Alternatively, a self-interested transaction may be ratified by
shareholder vote, so long as the director's or officer's interest in the transaction and the material
terms of such transaction are disclosed to the shareholders. See id., § 144(a)(2) (2003); see also
United States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp. 873, 880 (N.D. Ohio 1997) ("the primary purpose of such
statutes is to limit the common law rule of automatic voidability of transactions involving an
interested corporate official; it is not designed to preclude other legal challenges to interested
transactions simply because the corporate official is able to demonstrate compliance with one or
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must make certain that insider transactions are fair to the corporation
and to any other constituencies to which they owe fiduciary duties.
3. Beware of Fraudulent Transfer and Preference Liability
Most states have adopted either the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act 10 6 or the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 10 7 Under these
statutes, creditors can assert fraudulent transfer claims against the cor-
poration and its directors and officers. Additionally, if a corporation
is a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, two other fraudulent transfer
statutes apply. First, under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee or debtor in possession may institute a proceeding on behalf of
creditors to avoid fraudulent transfers that were made within one year
prior to the date that the bankruptcy petition was filed. 10 8 Second,
under Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee or debtor in
possession may institute a proceeding to avoid any transfer that is
voidable under non-bankruptcy (e.g., state) law. 109
a. Intentional Fraudulent Transfers
The UFCA, UFTA, and Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code all
function in much the same way. These statutes prohibit transfers, or
obligations incurred, with an intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud cred-
itors."'110 There are suggestions in several cases that proof of a con-
scious, improper purpose to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is not
required - and that, because "a party is deemed to have intended the
natural consequences of his acts,""' a transferor's knowledge, rather
more of the tests set forth in the statute") (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
106. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A Part 11 U.L.A. 2 (2003). The UFCA was
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1918.
The UFCA is in force in Maryland, New York, Tennessee, Wyoming and the Virgin Islands.
107. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A Part II U.L.A. 266 (2003). The UFTA was
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1984, and
is in force in thirty-nine states.
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2003).
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2003).
110. Section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits transfers made "with actual in-
tent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted . . ." 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1)(A). Section 4(a)(1) of the UFTA prohibits transfers made "with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor." Section 7 of the UFCA prohibits transfers
made "with actual intent ... to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors."
111. See Cieri, supra note 43, at 584-85 (citing United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803
F.2d 1288, 1304 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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than fraudulent motive, is the touchstone of the "intent" standard.
112
Accordingly, the transfer itself may be all that is necessary to demon-
strate the requisite wrongful intent," 3 and creditors would not need to
prove that the actual intent of the transfer was to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors. Rather, creditors may infer such intent by the cir-
cumstances surrounding the transfer." 4 Courts rely upon objective
evidence to infer actual intent of a transferor. Section 4(b) of the
UFTA provides so-called "badges of fraud," which include considera-
tion of whether:
* the transfer was to an insider of the transferor,
" the transferor retained possession or control of the property,
* the transferor was sued or threatened with a lawsuit before the
transfer was made,
" the transfer was of substantially all of the transferor's assets,
" the value of the consideration received by the transferor was not
reasonably equivalent to the value of the assets transferred,
* the transferor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the
transfer was made,
" the transfer occurred shortly before or after a substantial debt
was incurred, and
" the transferor transferred essential assets of the business to a lie-
nor, who in turn transferred the assets to an insider of the
transferor." 5
Though used not nearly as often as the "defraud" prong, the "hin-
der" and "delay" prongs of fraudulent transfer statutes are also signif-
icant. Fraudulent transfers include those that are made in order to
frustrate creditors by putting property beyond their reach. A transfer
may be fraudulent even if its purpose is merely to "buy some time" for
the transferor." 6
112. See, e.g., Ferrari v. Barclays Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re Morse Tool, Inc.), 148 B.R. 97, 138
(Bankr. D. Mass 1992) ("courts applying UFCA § 7 agree that, for purposes of determining
fraudulent intent, a party is deemed to have intended the natural consequences of his acts");
Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 127 B.R. 958, 990 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (noting that intent is
"often hard to prove" and held that a plaintiff may meet his or her burden of proof under the
UFCA by introducing evidence that supports an "inference of intent").
113. See Cieri, supra note 43, at 584-85.
114. See, e.g., Tabor Court Realty, 803 F.2d 1305 ("[u]nder Pennsylvania law, an intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors may be inferred from transfers in which consideration is lack-
ing and where the transferer (sic) and transferee have knowledge of the claims of creditors and
know that the creditors cannot be paid"); Moody, 127 B.R. at 990.
115. See Cieri, supra note 43, at 586.
116. See, e.g., Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1455 (W.D. Mich. 1988)
("[elven if the company only intended to hinder or delay creditors, these purposes satisfy the
intent element where a debtor's purpose is merely 'to stave off creditors by putting property
beyond their reach even when the purpose is not to cheat them of ultimate payment but only to
wrest from them time to restore the debtor's affairs"'); Bumgardner v. Ross (In re Ste. Jan-
Marie, Inc.), 151 B.R. 984, 987 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) ("actual intent to defraud will be found to
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b. Constructive Fraudulent Transfers
Even if there is no intent by management to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud creditors, a transaction can still be characterized as a fraudulent
transfer. A constructive fraudulent transfer is one in which a trans-
feror does not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer, and in which the transferor (a) is insolvent at the time of the
transfer or is rendered insolvent because of the transfer, (b) retains
unreasonably small capital with which to operate its business, or (c)
intends to incur debts beyond its ability to pay as those debts ma-
ture.117 There is no requirement to show ill intent. In determining
whether the value received by the transferor was "reasonably
equivalent," the focus is on the quantifiable economic consideration
received by the transferor in exchange for the transfer, rather than on
the value given up by the transferee. 118
If a corporation is or may be insolvent or in the zone of insolvency,
oftentimes it would be wise for the corporation's directors and officers
to retain the services of qualified outside professionals to determine
whether proposed transactions would yield the corporation reasona-
bly equivalent value. If professional services are retained, directors
and officers will meet their duty of care by relying on the analyses of
those professionals.' 19 On the other hand, reliance on such analyses
could be held to breach the duty of care, if they are flawed in some
fashion and the directors or officers have additional material informa-
tion at their disposal that would call into question the favorable opin-
ion of a transaction. 120
exist even where the debtor's purpose is not ultimately to deprive creditors of payment, but
merely to hinder or delay creditors").
117. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2003).
118. See Cieri, supra note 43, at 589 (citing Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d
978, 982 (1st Cir. 1983) ("the value to be considered is that received by the [transferor] and not
that forfeited by the transferee"); SPC Plastics Corp. v. Griffith (In re Structurlite Plastics
Corp.), 193 B.R. 451, 456 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) ("whether consideration in a transfer alleged
to be fraudulent is 'fair' must be viewed from the standpoint of the [transferor]")).
119. See Munford, Inc. v. Valuation Res. Corp., 98 F.3d 604, 611 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(directors that considered expert analysis when approving a leveraged buyout transaction did
not breach their fiduciary duties).
120. See Brandt v. Hicks & Muse, Co. (In re Healthco Int'l), 208 B.R. 296, 305-07 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997) (finding that directors breached their duty of care in deciding to approve a lever-
aged buyout transaction, when they did not review all material information available to them at
the time of the decision regarding the potentially harmful effects of the transaction on the com-
pany itself but relied solely on a flawed opinion of a solvency research company).
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c. Preferences
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy
trustee or debtor in possession may avoid transfers that the debtor
made to creditors within the ninety day period prior to the debtor's
bankruptcy filing.121 However, if a transfer is made to an "insider" of
the debtor, it may be avoided if it was made within one year prior to
the debtor's bankruptcy filing. 122 Though the Bankruptcy Code does
not clearly define the term "insider," the term does include directors,
officers, and "person[s] in control" of that corporation.123 Avoidable
transfers from the corporation include those that are not in the corpo-
ration's ordinary course of business, such as deferred compensation,
severance payments, and bonuses.
Unlike fraudulent conveyances, in order for a transfer to be avoided
as a preference, the bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession does
not need to show an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud or that the
corporation received an exchange of less than reasonably equivalent
value. Instead, the bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession needs
to show that the corporation was insolvent at the time of the transfer,
that the transfer was for or on account of an antecedent debt, and that
the transferee received more than it would have received in a Chapter
7 liquidation of the debtor.124 As a result, payments to directors or
officers within one year prior to the corporation's bankruptcy may be
avoided as preferential transfers, regardless of the intent of manage-
ment in making the payments.
C. Continue to Comply with Applicable Statutes and Regulations
As a corporation encounters financial problems, directors and of-
ficers may consider improving its short-term liquidity position by tem-
porarily ceasing to comply with certain laws or government
regulations. For instance, a corporation may delay in paying trust
fund taxes or in taking steps necessary to comply with labor, environ-
mental, or other regulations. However, directors and officers may
face personal liability for a corporation's failure to comply with these
laws and regulations. The prudent course for the long-term interests
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2003).
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2003).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2003).
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2003). There is a presumption that a debtor is insolvent during
the 90 days prior to its bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (2003). However, there is no pre-
sumption that the debtor was insolvent between 90 days and one year prior to its bankruptcy.
See Dent v. Martin, 86 B.R. 290, 291 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1988); In re Old World Cone Co., 119 B.R.
473, 476 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
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of both the corporation and its managers is to continue to comply with
these laws and regulations.
1. Tax Laws
Many tax statutes provide for personal liability of directors and of-
ficers of the corporation.125 Such personal liability is most prevalent
in cases involving "trust fund taxes" or taxes that are collected by a
corporation on behalf of a taxing authority and thus are never consid-
ered to be the corporation's property. Non-trust fund taxes may also
give rise to personal liability in many cases. Taxing authorities are typ-
ically eager to collect these funds from alternative sources if they can-
not collect from the corporation, and courts have interpreted statutes
in ways that give these authorities wide latitude to collect these taxes
from directors and officers personally.
a. Trust Fund Taxes
Generally, even though a trust fund tax is collected by a corpora-
tion, it is deemed to be held in trust for the government entity for
which it was collected. This trust is a creature of statutory law in
which funds remain in the general corporate accounts of the corpora-
tion rather than being placed aside in a separate trust fund.126 Be-
cause federal or state law provides that these funds are not the
property of the corporation, they are not considered property of the
bankruptcy estate when a corporation enters bankruptcy.' 27 As such,
these funds are not available to satisfy a corporation's creditors or for
other uses. In addition, this means that federal or state authorities
may continue to pursue these funds, despite the corporation's
bankruptcy.
Many of the laws relating to trust fund taxes provide for personal
liability of officers responsible for the corporation paying the taxes, if
the corporation fails to pay such taxes. For example, Section 6672(a)
125. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (2003) (making "responsible persons" liable for any pay-
ments which were willfully not made on federal trust fund taxes); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE
§ 6829 (Deering 2003) (providing for personal liability for unremitted sales tax collections for
officers of corporations that have ceased to conduct business); N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1131(1), 1133
(McKinney 2003) (providing for personal liability for any director or officer who is under a duty
to act for a corporation in complying with sales tax or fuel tax laws).
126. See, e.g., Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1990) (finding that FICA taxes had a trust
fund status when the relevant employee was paid, even if the funds were not segregated or
properly withheld).
127. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2003); Begier, 496 U.S. 53 at 66-67 (holding that federal income
taxes and ticket excise taxes withheld by a corporate debtor are not property of the bankruptcy
estate); City of Farell v. Sharon Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 92, 98-103 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding city in-
come tax withholdings to be a trust fund tax).
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of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "[a]ny person required to
collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this
title who willfully fails to collect such tax.., shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total
amount of the tax evaded or not collected. '' 128 This penalty applies to
any federal withholding tax, including income and social security taxes
collected by employers on behalf of employees. 129 Under IRS regula-
tions, these funds are typically held by a corporation before it is remit-
ted to the government. 30
In determining who may be liable under Section 6672 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, courts generally examine the degree of control
one has over corporate funds.' 31 Persons who have the ability to sign
checks on behalf of the corporation are often found to be responsi-
ble. 132 The IRS assumes that a corporation's president, secretary, and
treasurer all have the authority to pay payroll taxes.133 Courts have
even held liable persons who were ordered by a corporate superior
not to pay taxes.134 Corporate directors and officers have been held
responsible when they delegated responsibility to an employee to pay
the taxes, and were told by that employee that the taxes were being
paid, when they were in fact not paid.135
Given the significant issues arising from the failure to pay trust fund
taxes, directors and officers of potentially insolvent corporations
should ascertain that the corporation continues to pay trust fund taxes
on a current basis. Directors and officers should take particular care if
the corporation plans a bankruptcy filing, and the corporate debtor
should seek authority at the outset of a bankruptcy case to pay any
trust fund taxes in its possession.
b. Non-Trust Fund Taxes
A corporation's failure to pay non-trust fund taxes can also subject
directors and officers to personal liability. An example of a non-trust
128. 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (2003).
129. See Corrie Lynn Lyle, The Wrath of LR.C. § 6672: The Renewed Call for Change - Is
Anyone Listening? If You Are A Corporate Official, You Had Better Be, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133,
1134 (2001).
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Purcell v. United States, 1 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1993); Gephardt v. United
States, 818 F.2d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 1987).
132. See Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 734 (5th Cir. 1983).
133. Kimberly Ann De Bias, Draining the Power of Energy Resources: Subsequent Case Law
Preserves the Utility of LR.C. § 6672, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 545 (1992).
134. See Howard, 711 F.2d at 734.
135. See United States v. Rem, 38 F.3d 634, 643 (2d Cir. 1994).
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fund tax is a franchise tax.136 However, some courts have held that
directors and officers are not personally liable for unpaid corporate
taxes if they follow the advice of an attorney with regard to payment
of those taxes.1 37
2. Environmental Statutes and Regulations
Various environmental statutes provide for the personal liability of
directors and officers of corporations that are engaged in activities
that pose potential environmental hazards. 138 The most significant en-
vironmental statute is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 139
CERCLA grants the President of the United States broad power to
command government agencies and private parties to clean up haz-
ardous waste sites. CERCLA's two fundamental goals are to deter the
release of hazardous substances into the environment through a liabil-
ity scheme; and to provide for cleanup if a hazardous substance is re-
leased or threatened to be released into the environment. The statute
achieves these goals through two main provisions. First, the statute
provides for a federal fund that allows the government to finance the
cleanup of a waste site. Second, the statute provides a means for the
government or any other party funding a cleanup to recoup cleanup
costs from all potentially responsible parties. 140
"Potentially responsible parties" include (a) current owners and op-
erators of facilities where hazardous substances are released; (b) cur-
rent owners and operators of facilities where hazardous substances are
threatened to be released; (c) owners or operators of facilities at the
time that hazardous substances are disposed; (d) persons who ar-
ranged for the transportation, disposal, or treatment of hazardous sub-
136. See 68 OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1212 (2003); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a) (Vernon
2003).
137. See In re Stoecker, 179 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an officer lacked the
willfulness required to impose personal liability for unpaid use taxes on an airplane brought into
the state, because a reputable attorney had advised the corporation that it was not obligated to
pay the tax).
138. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1268(f) (2003) (providing for personal liability of directors and of-
ficers of corporations involved in a willful or knowing violation of surface coal mining regula-
tions); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2003) (providing for personal liability of officers of corporations
that engaged in criminal violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2003).
140. John W. Chapman, Parent Corporation Liability under CERCLA: An Analysis of the
Supreme Court's Failures and Fortunes in its Decision in United States v. Bestfoods, 14 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 307, 310 (1999).
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stances; and (e) persons who accepted such substances for transport to
disposal, or treatment. 14
1
"Notably, a potentially responsible party does not have to cause the
environmental harm, nor does the plaintiff have to prove causa-
tion."'1 42 Because of this, the primary defense to CERCLA liability is
to avoid being determined a potentially responsible party. However,
both "owners" and "operators" of contaminated facilities can be
deemed potentially responsible parties under CERCLA.143 Because
neither term is defined in the statute, courts define the scope of those
terms.
Operator liability under CERCLA creates liability for parties who
"exercise direction over the facility's activities."' This can result in
liability for parties that would ordinarily be shielded from liability,
without the need to meet the criteria for piercing the corporate veil.
145
In some cases, courts have found operator liability for officers who
had control of corporate operations that led to the emissions of haz-
ardous waste. For example, one court found an individual who was
the president, CEO, and sole shareholder of a corporation liable for
cleanup of a site where the corporation sent waste for disposal.146 An-
other court held personally liable a corporate officer who was in
charge of managing a facility for a corporation that purchased prop-
erty that was known to be contaminated. 47 Other courts have found
that the appropriate test for imposing operator liability on corporate
directors and officers is whether such individuals had sufficient au-
thority to control a facility at the time hazardous material was
discharged.148
State environmental laws provide differing approaches for imposing
director and officer liability. The variance in approaches under state
law means that directors and officers should carefully consider
whether they are in compliance with applicable state laws, and that
directors and officers should seek the advice of knowledgeable coun-
sel in analyzing environmental cleanup responsibilities.
Directors and officers of an insolvent or near-insolvent corporation
should be even more vigilant in ensuring that the corporation follows
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2003).
144. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 71 (1998).
145. See id. at 65.
146. Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distrib. Co., 166 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 1999).
147. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1985).
148. U.S. v. High Point Chem. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 770, 775-79 (W.D. Va. 1998) (discussing
cases).
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all applicable environmental laws and regulations. Otherwise, they
run the risk of being held personally liable for damages if the corpora-
tion is unable to pay its obligations. Retaining counsel and imple-
menting an environmental response program are steps that can spare
a corporation and its management from substantial liability.
3. Labor and Employment Laws
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 149 imposes various duties
and liabilities upon employers. The FLSA defines an "employer" as
"includ[ing] any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency,
but does not include any labor organization (other than when acting
as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of
such labor organization.' °5 0  Under the FLSA, directors and officers
are exposed to personal liability if they exercise operational control or
are directly responsible for employee supervision.151 In these situa-
tions, the directors and officers may be held jointly and severally lia-
ble with the corporation for unpaid wages. 152
Directors and officers also need to be mindful of their potential lia-
bility under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) 153 if the employer's "401(k)" or other employee benefit plan
invests in employer stock. ERISA imposes significant duties on "fidu-
ciaries" 154 of employee benefit plans. Often, a plan committee that
consists of officers and other high-level employees is designated as the
applicable fiduciary with respect to benefit plan investments. Numer-
149. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (2003).
150. Id. § 203.
151. See Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 637-38 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[t]he overwhelming weight of
authority is that a corporate officer with operational control of a corporation's covered enter-
prise is an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable under the FLSA for
unpaid wages") (citing Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir. 1983)).
152. See, e.g., Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 677-78 (1st Cir.
1998) (holding that officers who have operational control of significant aspects of the corpora-
tion's daily activities and who are employers under the FLSA may be personally liable for failure
to pay minimum and overtime wages); Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1131 (6th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a CEO and major owner of company who controlled significant functions of the
business, determined salaries and made hiring decisions was jointly liable with the corporation).
153. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2003).
154. ERISA's definition of "fiduciary" is expansive. It generally includes any person with
respect to a plan to the extent "(i) [s]he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) [s]he renders investment advice
for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property
of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) [s]he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." ERISA § 3(21)(A),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). Fiduciary status is determined under a functional analysis, rather than
based on official titles. Id.
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ous lawsuits in recent years have alleged that plan committees and
other fiduciaries have violated their duties in this regard. Among the
defendants in these lawsuits have been fiduciaries of the Tyco,
Worldcom, Duke Energy, Textron, Lucent, Global Crossing, Health-
south, and Xerox "401(k)" plans. The lawsuits generally have made
some or all of the following claims: (i) the relevant fiduciary knew of
material information that could affect the value of the stock and had a
fiduciary duty to disclose the information to plan participants, (ii) the
concentration of employer stock under the plan violated ERISA's
prudence requirements, or (iii) the circumstances required the com-
plete elimination of employer stock as an investment option and the
divestment of all of the plan's holdings. Although the law is still de-
veloping in this area, it seems clear that the applicable plan fiduciaries
may, at least in some circumstances, be required to take action to pro-
tect plan participants from likely declines in the value of employer
stock invested in the plan, especially if they are aware of nonpublic
information - such as an impending bankruptcy filing - that could
be expected to lead to a substantial decline in the stock price.155 This
can place fiduciaries in the awkward position of having to choose be-
tween their duty as officers and under the securities laws (to keep
such information confidential) and their duty as fiduciaries (possibly
to disclose such information for the benefit of plan participants or to
freeze or eliminate the employer stock investment alternative).
In addition, plaintiffs frequently allege that directors and officers
serve in "fiduciary" capacities with respect to employee benefit plans
and, thus, may be liable if they fail to act in the face of declining stock
values. Thus, financially troubled employers need to closely review
the fiduciary structure of their plans in order to minimize potential
exposure for directors and officers.
D. D&O Insurance: Problems Caused by Bankruptcy
Corporations typically elect to protect their directors and officers by
purchasing directors' and officers' insurance (D&O insurance). D&O
insurance covers directors and officers if they are sued because of
their management of the corporation. D&O insurance takes on an
increased importance in bankruptcy because a corporate debtor may
be unable or unwilling to pay judgments, settlements, and costs of de-
155. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig. (Tittle v. Enron Corp.), 284 F.
Supp 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003); see also Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 568-72 (3d Cir. 1995);
Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1457-60 (6th Cir. 1995) (there can be a duty to diversify the
assets of an employee stock ownership plan out of employer stock in certain circumstances).
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fense incurred by directors and officers. 156 As such, a corporation's
bankruptcy may change the degree to which, or even whether, certain
D&O insurance policies will cover directors and officers of a finan-
cially distressed company. 157
When a corporation and its directors and officers are co-insureds
under a D&O insurance policy with a single limit of liability, the bank-
ruptcy of the corporation may have a profound effect on the right of
directors and officers to the coverage under the policy.158 In bank-
ruptcy, the policy proceeds of certain types of D&O insurance cover-
age may belong in whole or in part to the corporation's bankruptcy
estate. 159 If this is the case, the automatic stay imposed under the
Bankruptcy Code 160 could prohibit directors and officers from having
recourse to the proceeds and deem the proceeds an estate asset, which
would be shared by all creditors.161 Some bankruptcy courts have
demonstrated a willingness to seize control of the proceeds of the
D&O insurance policies when corporations file for bankruptcy
protection. 62
The difficulties directors and officers face with respect to D&O in-
surance in bankruptcy relate directly to the type of insurance in-
volved. Accordingly, directors and officers should carefully review
their D&O insurance policies periodically, especially if the corpora-
tion is insolvent or in the zone of insolvency.
Courts tend to distinguish between an insurance policy and its pro-
ceeds when deciding what is the property of the corporation's bank-
ruptcy estate. With certain insurance policies, such as general liability
or fire protection policies, both the policy and its proceeds are typi-
cally considered property of the corporation's bankruptcy estate. 163
However, courts have recognized that this general rule does not apply
to D&O insurance policies, because they fundamentally differ from
156. See Jonathan C. Dickey, et al., Indemnification and Insurance for Directors and Officers
of Public Companies: What Directors and Officers Need to Know in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley
World 16 (Oct. 8, 2003) (on file with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP). This is an excellent piece
on the current major issues relating to D&O insurance.
157. See Nan Roberts Eitel, Now You Have It, Now You Don't: Directors' and Officers' Insur-
ance After a Corporate Bankruptcy, 46 Lov. L. REV. 585, 585-86 (2000).
158. See id. at 585.
159. The Bankruptcy Code defines "property of the estate" to include "all legal and equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." See 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(1).
160. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2003).
161. See Eitel, supra note 157, at 585-86.
162. D&O Insurance Draws a Crowd, THE DAILY DEAL (Mar. 11, 2002) (noting that D&O
insurance policies have "become fair game in bankruptcies").
163. Louisiana World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1391, 1401 (5th Cir. 1987).
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other types of liability insurance. The corporation is often not the di-
rect beneficiary of the policy.1 64 In most cases, the corporation
purchases the policy for the benefit of its directors and officers, and
not for the benefit or protection of the corporation itself.165 Also, the
proceeds typically do not inure to the benefit of the company, but
rather to its officers and directors. 166 Due to the structural differences
between D&O insurance and general liability policies, courts have
created a distinction between ownership of the policy and ownership
of its proceeds.
1. Types of D&O Insurance
There are three basic types of coverage found in typical D&O insur-
ance policies: (a) direct coverage of officers and directors (also known
as "Side A" coverage), (b) coverage of indemnification payments that
the corporation is permitted or required to make to directors and of-
ficers (also known as "Side B" coverage), and (c) entity coverage,
which covers the corporation's own losses arising from a claim.167
Each type of coverage, and the possible effect of a corporation's bank-
ruptcy on directors and officers with regard to the type of coverage, is
described below.
a. Direct Coverage of Directors and Officers
Direct coverage covers the losses of directors and officers when the
corporation has not indemnified them.168 The proceeds are paid di-
rectly to the directors and officers of the corporation, and the corpora-
tion does not have an ownership interest in the funds paid under a
direct coverage policy.169
Courts have reasoned that although the insurance policy itself may
be the property of the corporation's estate in bankruptcy, only the
directors and officers covered by the direct coverage policy have the
164. See id. at 1399-1400; Gillman v. Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 216 (3d Cir. 2000).
165. See, e.g., Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n v. Ventresco (In re Youngstown Osteo-
pathic Hosp. Ass'n), 271 B.R. 544, 550 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002) ("[w]hile [the debtor] is the
named insured on the policy, the policy is for the benefit of the directors and officers"); see also
Dickey, supra note 156, at 17-18.
166. See Dickey, supra note 156, at 18.
167. See Eitel, supra note 157, at 588.
168. See id.
169. See, e.g., Louisiana World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re Louisiana World Exposi-
tion, Inc.), 832 F.2d 1391, 1399 (5th Cir. 1987).
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right to the proceeds from the policy. 170 As a result, the proceeds
from a direct coverage policy are not property of the estate. 171
Such a determination is good for directors and officers, because the
insurance proceeds would not be subject to the automatic stay, and
because directors and officers would not have to share the proceeds
with the corporation's creditors. However, if a policy combines direct
coverage with indemnity coverage or entity coverage, it becomes less
clear whether proceeds from the policy are property of the corpora-
tion's bankruptcy estate.
b. Indemnification Coverage
With indemnification coverage, the corporation itself has the right
to receive the proceeds of the policy. Many corporate charters and
bylaws require corporations to indemnify directors and officers in cer-
tain circumstances. 172 Accordingly, many corporations include indem-
nification provisions in their D&O insurance policies. These
provisions state that the corporation shall receive proceeds to the de-
gree necessary to reimburse the corporation for its indemnification
payments to officers and directors.173
Since indemnification coverage allows the corporation to receive
the funds paid by the insurance policy, some courts have determined
that policies containing indemnification provisions are property of the
bankruptcy estate.174 This can cause a significant problem when the
indemnification coverage and the director coverage have a single lia-
bility cap, because the corporation and its officers and directors then
170. See id. at 1401; see also Gillman v. Continental Airlines (In re Continental Airlines), 203
F.3d 203, 216 (3d Cir. 2000) (proceeds from an insurance policy should be evaluated separately
from the debtor's interest in the policy itself); Houston v. Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 56 (5th Cir.
1993) ("When the debtor has no legally cognizable claim to the insurance proceeds, those pro-
ceeds are not property of the estate."); First Cent. Fin. Corp. v. Lipson (In re First Cent. Fin.
Corp.), 238 B.R. 9, 16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("While a majority of courts consider a D&O
policy estate property, there is an increasing view that a distinction should be drawn when con-
sidering treatment of proceeds under such policies."); In re Daisy Sys. Sec. Litig., 132 B.R. 752,
755 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991) (proceeds from D&O policy found not to be estate property be-
cause the directors and officers were the primary beneficiaries under the plan).
171. See, e.g., Louisiana World Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d at 1401.
172. See Eitel, supra note 157, at 600-05.
173. See id.
174. See, e.g., In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 182 B.R. 413, 419-21 (E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Jasmine,
Ltd., 258 B.R. 119, 128 (D.N.J. 1999); Minoco Group of Cos., Ltd. v. First State Underwriters
Agency, 799 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1986) (policies are "property of the estate because the poli-
cies insure the corporation against indemnity claims"); In re Circle K Corp., 121 B.R. 257, 259
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990) ("Louisiana World appears distinguishable as it primarily focused on
director-officer liability coverage, not indemnification coverage. Thus, that court had no need to
address the issue confronted ... : Whether the policy protects against a diminution of estate
assets").
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have competing claims to a single sum of money. The result is that
directors and officers can be cut off from the D&O insurance
proceeds.
On the other hand, many courts have stated that the proceeds from
indemnification coverage are not the property of the corporation.
The reasoning behind this is that indemnification insurance only in-
sures the corporation for its liability to the directors and officers, and
that the corporation has no right to keep those proceeds when the
insurer paid on a claim. In essence and at its core, a D&O policy
remains a safeguard of officer and director interests and not a vehicle
for corporate protection. 175
c. Entity Coverage
Entity coverage is a part of D&O insurance policies that covers the
corporation itself for losses relating to claims brought against it.176
Until the recent advent of entity coverage, D&O insurance policies
did not insure the company for securities or other claims brought
against the company. In typical securities class action lawsuits, where
both the corporation and its directors and officers were sued, "alloca-
tion" disputes between the insureds and the insurance companies oc-
curred.177 Insurance companies had the incentive to argue that large
portions of joint liability with insured directors and officers were at-
tributable to the corporation (which was uninsured), rather than to
individual directors and officers (who were insured). 178
Entity coverage solved the allocation dispute problems by making
entity liability a covered claim. However, many insurance companies
now believe that entity coverage creates a situation where corpora-
tions no longer have an incentive to keep litigation and settlement
costs low, as long as a settlement can be achieved within the limits of
the policy.179 Furthermore, when insured companies file for bank-
ruptcy protection, the presence of entity coverage has made it more
likely for bankruptcy courts to find that the proceeds of the D&O
175. See, e.g., In re CHS Elecs., Inc., 261 B.R. 538, 542 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) ("The fact that
[the corporation] obtained and owned the policies is not here determinative. Instead, the court
must focus on who has the rights against the proceeds"); In re Daisy Sys. Sec. Litig., 132. B.R.
752, 755 (proceeds are not estate property because the directors and officers are the primary
beneficiaries of the D&O insurance policy).
176. See Eitel, supra note 157, at 588-89.
177. See Dickey, supra note 156, at 10.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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policy should be swept into the corporation's bankruptcy estate, be-
cause those proceeds make the estate more valuable. 18 0
Because of the possibility that proceeds of a D&O insurance policy
that includes entity coverage would be found to be part of the corpo-
ration's bankruptcy estate, the inclusion of entity coverage may leave
directors and officers virtually uninsured if the corporation enters
bankruptcy and a claim is brought against both the corporation and its
officers and directors.' 81 Because an insurance policy with entity cov-
erage provides coverage directly to the corporation for its own losses,
there is a possibility for the courts to hold that all of the proceeds
from the insurance policy are property of the corporation's bank-
ruptcy estate. 18 2
When directors and officers are sued, creditors of the insolvent cor-
poration often attempt to prevent payment of the insurance proceeds
to the directors and officers, because payments to directors and of-
ficers would reduce the amount of proceeds available to be shared
among creditors. When both the corporate debtor and the directors
and officers are defendants in ongoing litigation, the corporation's
creditors would prefer to reserve any proceeds from insurance policies
to pay for the legal fees and liability of the corporation, because doing
so would preserve more of the corporation's assets for creditors. 183
This approach would leave directors and officers without meaningful
coverage, and would force them to pay legal fees and liabilities out of
their own pockets. Few courts have ruled expressly on whether the
existence of entity coverage would result in ownership by the corpora-
tion of the D&O insurance proceeds. One court refused to establish a
per se rule, but rather stated that the question had to be answered on a
case-by-case basis.'8 4
2. Treatment of D&O Indemnity Claims in Bankruptcy as
Unsecured Claims
Finally, directors and officers should make sure they have adequate
insurance even though the corporation has promised to indemnify
them for the costs incurred in fulfilling their duties as directors. Di-
rectors and officers should not rely on indemnification claims against
the corporation after it enters bankruptcy proceedings. Such claims
180. See id.
181. See Eitel, supra note 157, at 590.
182. See id.
183. See In re Minoco Group of Cos. Ltd. v. First State Underwriters Agency, 799 F.2d at 519;
In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 182 B.R. 413, 419-21 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
184. See Ochs v. Lipson (In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 238 B.R. 9, 16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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may be disallowed by the bankruptcy court, which means that direc-
tors and officers would receive nothing on account of their claims.
Even if indemnification claims are allowed by the bankruptcy court,
directors and officers receive little or no recovery on account of their
indemnification claims.185 This is because indemnification claims
against a bankrupt corporation are unsecured and paid along with
other unsecured creditors. Furthermore, if there is evidence of
wrongdoing by directors and officers in the management of the corpo-
ration, courts may place the claims of directors for indemnification
behind claims for general creditors to the estate, under the doctrine of
equitable subordination. 186 Accordingly, D&O insurance that will
cover directors and officers in the event of bankruptcy is absolutely
necessary. 87
3. Alternative Mechanisms
In response to concerns about the availability of indemnification
and D&O insurance coverage, and in an effort to provide their direc-
tors and officers with the maximum possible protection from personal
liability, many companies are exploring alternative ways to fund in-
demnification, as well as alternatives to traditional D&O insurance. 88
Alternative mechanisms generally fall into two categories: (a) mecha-
nisms that serve as a means of funding indemnification by segregating
funds and authorizing their release when certain procedures are fol-
lowed, such as indemnification trusts and letters of credit, and (b)
mechanisms that may serve as a substitute for traditional D&O insur-
ance and that can provide coverage for claims that may not be indem-
nifiable under state and federal law, such as captive insurance
companies. 189
Whether these mechanisms can work as a substitute for traditional
insurance depends on whether they constitute "insurance" under state
and federal law. This is significant because if an arrangement is not
insurance, the amounts used to fund the arrangement may not be tax-
deductible. 190 In addition, funding these mechanisms may not be au-
thorized with corporate funds under a state statute that permits the
185. See Eitel, supra note 157, at 606-08.
186. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2003); see also In re Mid-Am. Waste Sys., Inc., 228 B.R. 816, 826
(Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (noting that "claims emanating from tainted securities law transactions
should not have the same priority as the claims of general creditors of the estate").
187. See Eitel, supra note 157, at 606.
188. See Dickey, supra note 156, at 26.
189. See id. at 26.
190. See id.
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purchase of insurance, but does not explicitly authorize expenditures
for special arrangements. 191
a. Drop-Down Insurance
Another step that directors and officers can take to protect them-
selves against the possibility of bankruptcy is to secure drop-down in-
surance. 192 Drop-down insurance provides coverage if the directors
and officers are denied coverage for any reason under the primary
insurance plan.' 93 Drop-down coverage may be purchased as an addi-
tional provision to most insurance agreements or may be purchased as
a separate policy.' 94 The latter approach has the advantage of having
a policy clearly intended solely for the benefit of the directors and
officers. If such a policy consists only of director and officer coverage
in the event of a failure of the underlying insurance policy, the estate
will not be able to claim a right in the proceeds of the drop-down
policy.
b. Indemnification Trusts
A possible mechanism for funding a corporation's indemnification
obligation is an indemnification trust. Indemnification trusts, if appro-
priately structured, can provide directors and officers with greater
comfort that funding will be available in the event of a corporation's
insolvency. 195 Under an indemnification trust, a third party trustee
holds in trust funds that a corporation deposits for the benefit of the
corporate officials who are entitled to indemnification. Claims for in-
demnification are paid as they arise in accordance with procedures set
forth in the trust documents.196
Although indemnification trusts have received only limited judicial
scrutiny, some case law suggests that they are enforceable gener-
ally. 197 An appropriately structured indemnification trust could possi-
bly be irrevocable and unamendable. This assures, to the extent
possible, that the corpus of the trust will be beyond the reach of credi-
tors in the event of insolvency. 198 Although the trust documents could
191. See id. Delaware law does not explicitly authorize expenditures of corporate funds for
special insurance arrangements. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (2003).
192. See Eitel, supra note 157, at 604-05.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See Dickey, supra note 156, at 27.
196. See id.
197. See id. (citing Sec. Am. Corp. v. Walsh, No. 82 C 2953, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23482
(N.D. II. Jan. 11, 1985) (applying Delaware law)).
198. See Dickey, supra note 156, at 28.
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provide that a trust becomes irrevocable and unamendable automati-
cally upon insolvency, this may make the trust more vulnerable to
challenge by a bankruptcy trustee or the corporation's creditors. 199
Additionally, there may be a risk that payments to directors and of-
ficers from indemnification trusts would be avoidable as a preferential
transfer or a fraudulent conveyance.
c. Captive Insurance Company
Corporations may consider using a captive insurance company to
fill in gaps in its D&O insurance. Captive insurance companies re-
quire the formation and capitalization of a wholly owned insurance
company by a parent entity.2°° The captive insurance policy is man-
aged by insurance brokers or other professional insurance managers,
and provides insurance policies that are generally modeled on com-
mercially available policies, except that it may omit exclusions and re-
strictions that are objectionable to the parent company. A captive
insurance company can provide cost-reduction benefits because its
premium schedules focus on the parent company's loss history and
actuarial analysis. 201
Whether a captive insurance company policy can effectively fill gaps
in indemnification coverage depends on whether it constitutes "insur-
ance" under state and federal law. Because insurance generally in-
volves a spreading or shifting of loss, 20 2 an insurance policy that
assigns the risk to a wholly owned company - whose profits and losses
are borne entirely by the parent company - is unlikely to qualify as
insurance and the amounts used to fund the policy may not be tax
deductible. 20 3 This problem may be averted by establishing a group
captive insurance company, in which risk is spread among a number of
unrelated corporations. However, with a group captive insurance
company, each participating corporation must agree on the terms of
implementation and each participant must be comfortable with the
others' risks.2°4
199. See id.
200. See Dickey, supra note 156, at 28-29.
201. See id. at 29.
202. See id. (citing Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) (stating that, in the tax
context, "historically and commonly insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing")).
203. See id.
204. See id.
338 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:295
VI. CONCLUSION
Directors and officers of a corporation that is either insolvent or in
the zone of insolvency face risks in the management of their company.
If a corporation cannot cover the claims of disappointed creditors,
shareholders and others, they might attempt to seek recovery from its
directors and officers personally. With this in mind, those who man-
age these companies must be aware of the shifting fiduciary obliga-
tions and their continuing obligations to comply with applicable laws.
Careful planning is necessary to navigate these increasingly dangerous
waters. The following checklist delineates action items for directors
and officers in minimizing potential liability.
2004] DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND THE ZONE OF INSOLVENCY
Minimizing Potential Liability: Action Items for
Directors and Officers
I. DETERMINE THE POTENTIAL INSOLVENCY OF
THE CORPORATION
El Review the corporation's historical financial statements.
El Calculate applicable financial ratios for the corporation, and com-
pare these ratios to those of competitors.
0 Review the corporation's business plan projections and assump-
tions, and compare them to historical performance, the expected
performance of competitors, and industry trends.
[] Investigate and analyze the corporation's business by assessing
the current conditions and external competitive factors that will
impact its operations and financial performance.
0 Investigate and analyze current market conditions that would im-
pact the corporation's sources of funding (including equity mar-
kets, debt markets, and interest rates).
E Test the sensitivity of the corporation's financial projections with
respect to revenue variations, margin variations, and interest rate
changes.
o Determine the corporation's liquidity and free cash flow levels
under the projection scenarios.
[ Perform and evaluate a covenant compliance test for the corpora-
tion's funded debt obligations under the projection scenarios.
" Evaluate the equity cushion available to the company under each
of the projection scenarios.
" Evaluate the safety margin of the cash flows under each projec-
tion scenario.
" Investigate and assess the value of the corporation's assets (in-
cluding deferred assets).
" Investigate and assess the corporation's contingent and off bal-
ance sheet liabilities.
o Retain professionals to value assets.
II. COMPLY WITH FIDUCIARY DUTIES
o If the corporation is in the vicinity or zone of insolvency, carefully
consider whether corporate decisions benefit the corporation, its
shareholders, and its creditors. In other words, ensure that the
proposed course of action would maximize the value of the
corporation.
o Make sure that directors and officers possess all material infor-
mation relating to each business decision.
0 Carefully consider how each business decision would impact the
corporation's stakeholders.
Eo If prudent, seek the advice of qualified experts inside and outside
of the corporation.
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" The board of directors should keep very detailed minutes of each
meeting, which describes everything that the board considered
before making its decisions.
" Maintain written reports and memoranda that reflect in detail the
materials reviewed and discussed in connection with a business
decision.
" Take advantage of any applicable legal "safe harbor" provisions.
[] Avoid transactions with insiders and other conflicts of interest.
El Avoid preferential treatment of insiders, and do not accept per-
sonal benefits for supporting or opposing a particular transaction.
III. MINIMIZE LIABILITY ARISING FROM
CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS
Ll Comply with laws regarding the payment of dividends and re-
garding stock redemptions.
El If insider transactions are consummated, make certain that these
transactions are fair to the corporation.
Ll Refrain from making transfers by the corporation that may be
seen as an attempt to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
0l Refrain from making transfers by the corporation, in which the
corporation does not receive reasonably equivalent value in
exchange.[L If such transactions are commenced, create a record of the fair-
ness of the transaction. Remember that all decisions will be re-
viewed in hindsight.
IV. AVOID PERSONAL LIABILITY RESULTING FROM THE
CORPORATION'S VIOLATIONS OF LAW
El Ensure that the corporation continues to pay all taxes as they
come due.
[ Ensure that the corporation continues to comply with environ-
mental laws and regulations.
El Ensure that the corporation continues to comply with labor and
employment statutes and regulations, including ERISA and the
Fair Labor Standards Act.
V. PROTECT D&O INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE EVENT OF THE
CORPORATION'S BANKRUPTCY
El Carefully review the corporation's D&O insurance policies to en-
sure that directors and officers are covered if the corporation files
for bankruptcy. Consult experts if necessary.
ED If necessary, consider drop-down insurance or alternatives to
D&O insurance, to ensure coverage in case directors and officers
are denied coverage for any reason under the primary D&O in-
surance plan.
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